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Abstract

In the enterprise application software industry, dominant system vendors (hubs) have
formed strategic partnerships with small software companies (spokes), resulting in the
emergence of hub-and-spoke networks. Based upon the concept of software stacks, we
argue that the governance mechanisms applied by hub and spokes depend on the
complementarity between hub’s and spoke’s resources. Specifically, we draw on the
relational view and combine it with the resource dependence theory to develop a
theoretical framework that explains the link between the type of complementarity and
differential governance mechanisms. We are able to show that while hubs seek to take
advantage of complementarities with the entire network of partners, spokes are
primarily interested in gaining access to complementary resources and capabilities of
the hub organization. In order to leverage the benefits of resource complementarity,
hubs mainly invest in network-specific resources to generate value. On the contrary, the
spokes’ investments are hub-specific. Accordingly, hubs only face minor threats of
opportunistic behavior on the part of a specific spoke, whereas the spokes’ existence is
endangered by the threat of opportunistic behavior by the hub. Due to these three
asymmetries, hubs apply formal governance mechanisms in order to efficiently
coordinate the network of spokes, whereas spokes rely on informal governance
mechanisms.
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Introduction
The structure of the enterprise application software (EAS) industry has been
undergoing significant changes during the last decades. While early systems were
custom-developed in a make-to-order fashion, in the 1970s, standardized, monolithic
systems that covered the majority of the business processes of a variety of customers
emerged and became the state-of-the-art during the 1980s. This turned the formerly
diverse industry into an oligopolistic structure with a few dominating major system
vendors (Campbell-Kelly, 2003).
In recent years, however, this trend has been countervailed by a tendency towards
disintegration (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999, Messerschmitt and Szyperski,
2003). Facilitated by the emergence of standards and middleware technologies, like
e.g. service-oriented architectures, the formerly integrated systems are more and
more characterized by a high degree of modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 1997). From
a theoretical point of view, it can be argued that the tendency towards disintegrated
systems should be mirrored by a higher degree of organizational modularity
(Conway,

1968,

Hoetker,

2006).

However,

in

spite

of

the

increasing

interorganizational division of labor in the EAS industry, a seamless coordination
between different organizations and friction-free mixing and matching of software
components from different vendors is still a vision. Instead, partnership networks
have emerged in which companies of the EAS industry agree to work together
closely based on some mutually agreed standards (Gao and Iyer, 2008). Within these
partnership networks, a limited number of large organizations, often referred to as
hubs, platform leaders or keystones (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002, Iansiti and Levien,
1
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2004, Jarillo, 1988), provide the systems’ architecture as well as generic core
functionalities, while smaller software companies (referred to as spokes or niche
players) build their solutions upon and complement these platforms (Iansiti and
Levien, 2004, Prencipe, 2003). The compatibility and functionality of the spokes’
solutions is thereby often ensured through a certification of the spokes’ products or
resources by the hub organization. The spokes represent independent legal entities
that, unlike in supplier networks (e.g. in the automotive sector), sell their solutions
directly to the market. Moreover, partner networks in the EAS industry are special in
that although there is no direct exchange of tradable goods between the hub and the
spokes, the networks compete with each other in a system competition that is
characterized by network effects (Farrell et al., 1998, Shapiro and Varian, 1999).
We argue that this hub-and-spoke structure may often result in strong imbalance
between partners, which in turn raises questions about the long term sustainability of
such partnership arrangements. Hubs are generally perceived to be dominant over
spokes due to their supremacy regarding assets, investments, market share, profits, as
well as resource and revenue dependencies (Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). 1 Bearing in
mind this imbalance between hub and spokes, we argue that it is of special
theoretical and practical interest to examine governance mechanisms applied in
partnerships between dominant and non-dominant firms within partner networks in

1

In the network structure observed in practice, hybrid forms exist. Some companies represent a spoke
in one network, while taking the role of a hub in its own hub-and-spoke network. For instance, IBM
and SAP are partners but have both established a network of spokes. In order to properly examine the
impact of firm dominance, we focus on partnerships between dominant hubs and small spokes.

2
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the EAS industry. For example, the question is raised how small spoke organizations
ensure that dominant hubs will not behave opportunistically, e.g. by substituting or
imitating the small organizations’ products or by replacing the partner with another
firm (i.e. partner). Power imbalance and the ensuing risk of opportunistic behavior
call for appropriate governance mechanisms for alleviating partnership risks and for
ensuring that the expected benefits of the partnership can be realized.
In order to study differential forms and outcomes of partnerships, previous literature
has drawn on the economic theory of complementarities (Milgrom and Roberts,
1995). As such, it has been argued that the success of interorganizational
arrangements in the software industry is dependent upon the respective position of
the organizations within a software stack that reflects the architecture of the overall
system (Gao and Iyer, 2006). Building on existing research, we apply the idea of
complementarities between software firms to the special case of the EAS industry.
Specifically, we shed more light on the theoretical reasons for value creation through
inter-firm complementarity in the EAS industry. By studying the intermediate role of
alternative governance mechanisms as a major prerequisite for achieving successful
relationships (Lavie, 2007), we add to previous research that has mainly focused on
the direct impact of inter-firm product complementarity on partnership success (Gao
and Iyer, 2008).
Taken together, this paper aims at theoretically answering the question of how the
type of complementarity between the partners influences the choice of governance
mechanisms applied by hub and spoke organizations within the EAS industry in
order to leverage the benefits of complementary resource endowments. Our

3
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theoretical analysis builds on the relational view of competitive advantage (Dyer and
Singh, 1998) together with the resource-dependence theory (RDT, Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978). Based on these two theoretical lenses a framework is developed that
explains how the choice of different governance mechanisms by hub and spoke
organizations in the EAS industry is influenced by three types of interrelated
asymmetries between hub and spoke. The paper is structured as follows. First, the
relational view is introduced. Subsequently, in order to develop our theoretical
framework, the theoretical assertions of the relational view are analyzed in the light
of relationships between hubs and spokes in the EAS industry. Finally, the
framework is discussed and conclusions are drawn.

A Relational View on Hub-and-Spoke Networks
The Relational View of Inter-Organizational Competitive Advantage

In drawing on the resource-based view of the firm (RBV, Barney, 1991, Wernerfelt,
1984) and on transaction cost economics (TCE, Williamson, 1981), the relational
view of interorganizational competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998) holds that
firms can create relational rents when entering into partnerships with other firms that
provide complementary resources. According to Dyer and Singh, complementary
resources are “distinctive resources of alliance partners that collectively generate
greater rents than the sum of those obtained from the individual endowments of each
partner” (Dyer and Singh, 1998, p. 666f). In order to leverage the potential benefits
of complementary resources, firms have to invest in relation-specific assets (Dyer
and Singh, 1998). Accordingly, the relationship itself can become the source of a

4
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competitive advantage if in fact it is unique (i.e. specific) and hence hard to imitate
or substitute by competitors. This actually extends the key argument of the RBV,
which has its primary focus on the internal resources of a firm (Amit and
Schoemaker, 1993).
From a TCE perspective, however, increasing asset specificity leads to higher
transaction costs, given that organizations that invest in relation-specific assets run
the risk of opportunistic behavior on the part of their collaborators (Coase, 1937,
Williamson, 1981). While advocates of TCE perceive this as a trade-off and propose
integration of transactions into the hierarchical organization as a remedy for
transaction costs caused by high asset specificity, Dyer argues that transaction costs
“do not necessarily increase with an increase in relation-specific investments” (1997,
p. 551). Such a perspective emphasizes transaction value instead of transaction costs
and holds that both inter-firm investments in relation-specific assets and transaction
cost discrimination are simultaneously feasible (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). More
specifically, the central argument of the relational view is that interorganizational
competitive advantage can be generated through inter-firm arrangements if the
relationships move away from market transactions and, instead, invest in (1) interfirm relation-specific assets as well as (2) inter-firm knowledge-sharing routines,
exploit (3) complementary resource endowments, and apply (4) effective governance
mechanisms (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Regarding the persistence of relational rents,
Dyer and Singh’s (1998) relational view again draws on the RBV of the firm and
argues that competitive advantages by definition have to be difficult to imitate.

5
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Several of the mechanisms that help to sustain competitive advantages mentioned by
Dyer and Singh can be subsumed under the term “uniqueness of the relationship”.2
There are indications, however, that entering into unique relationships may not
generally be the desired end for both parties of a relationship. For example, Lavie
(2007) argues that alliances with dominant firms may promote the creation of value,
but make it difficult for non-dominant firms to appropriate the created value.
Moreover, the effect of power imbalance on value appropriation is found to increase
with the level of bilateral competition between the firms (Lavie, 2007).3 Lavie’s
findings of the software industry hint upon the importance of governance
mechanisms to create and appropriate value in situations of firm dominance.
However, the impact of resource complementarities on governance mechanisms is
not explicitly considered.
This paper fills this gap and further analyzes the consequences of the imbalance
between hub and spokes in the EAS industry on the alignment between
complementarities and governance mechanisms from the perspective of the relational
view. In order to do so, we discuss the sources of relational rents and the resulting
rent preserving mechanisms in the light of partnerships between dominant and non-

2

Namely, causal ambiguities, time compression diseconomies, inter-organizational asset
interconnectedness, and resource indivisibility prevent competitors from imitating the unique
relationships of a focal dyad of companies (Barney, 1991, Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Additionally,
Dyer and Singh mention the scarcity of potential partners and the institutional environment as factors
that impede an imitation of inter-organizational competitive advantages.
3

Such a situation of cooperation and competition is sometimes referred to as “co-opetiton” (Nalebuff
and Brandenburger, 1997).

6
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dominant organizations in the EAS industry. While Dyer and Singh (1998) present
the four sources of relational rents in an unconnected manner, we introduce a chain
of reasoning that logically relates the different categories to each other, both from the
spokes’ and the hubs’ perspective. In order to properly examine the alignment of
resource complementarities and governance mechanisms, we first focus on inter-firm
resource complementarities. Subsequently, investments in relation-specific assets and
knowledge-creation that are necessary to benefit from resource complementarities
and the resulting threat of opportunistic behavior will be analyzed. Finally, the
consequences for governance mechanisms will be discussed.
Generation of Relational Rents in Hub-and-Spoke Networks
Resource Complementarity

While previous research has focused on differences in the degree of complementarity
between software firms (Gao and Iyer, 2008), we argue that within hub-and-spoke
networks in the EAS industry, different types of complementarities exist. Moreover,
complementarity may not only become important on a technological level, but also
regarding the commercial and social capital of firms. These different types of
complementarities are discussed below in order to subsequently study the
consequences for the governance mechanisms applied by hub and spokes.
Spoke Perspective. In order to better understand the notion of complementarity it is
instructive to analyze the reasons for why firms enter into partnerships more closely.
Several authors have transferred the idea of the RBV on interorganizational
arrangements, stating that strategic assets may be accessed though inter-firm

7
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cooperation (Das and Teng, 2000, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996, Lavie, 2006).
Thereby, especially those firms that suffer from a shortage of certain resources will
try to form partnerships or alliances in order to overcome these resource gaps
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996). However, in order to access resources through
inter-firm collaboration, firms not only have to be willing to fill their own resource
gaps, but also have to be attractive as a potential partner themselves, i.e., they have to
possess certain resources which their potential collaborator lacks. This “duality of
inducements and opportunities” (Ahuja, 2000) is particularly problematic for small
and young companies. On the one hand, small and young companies often face what
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) call “strategic vulnerable positions” and are
therefore prone to a lack of resources (Welsh and White, 1981). On the other hand,
due to their limited size and often short period of existence, small and young
companies will hardly be able to offer significant resources to potential partners, thus
reducing the possibilities to overcome their own resource gaps through partnering
(Ahuja, 2000, Dierickx and Cool, 1989).
The hub-and-spoke networks that emerged in the EAS industry seem to be a possible
way-out of this dilemma. Through their partnerships with a hub, spokes can access
external resources and dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997) that the hub disposes
of. Ahuja (2000) proposes a taxonomy of strategic resources obtained through
interorganizational cooperation that divide the resource endowments of potential
partners into technological capital, commercial capital, and social capital. From a
technological point of view, hubs provide the architecture that the spokes’ solutions
are based upon. Innovating this architecture on a regular basis is deemed especially

8
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crucial in a dynamically changing environment like the EAS industry (Henderson
and Clark, 1990). Regarding commercial capital, hub companies that usually act on a
global scale and have a large installed base of customers offer small spokes the
possibility to access markets and marketing channels that would otherwise be
unreachable. Furthermore, hubs dispose of social capital that spokes could benefit
from in that they improve their own visibility and credibility by making use of the
hub’s reputation and high profile and encourage hub personnel to recommend and
promote the spoke’s solution.
Hub Perspective. The hub organization, on the other hand, also benefits from the
spokes’ strategic resources (Rothaermel, 2001). First and foremost, hubs can exploit
the spokes’ commercial and social capital to address niche markets they have so far
not been able or willing to approach. Regarding technological capital, spokes are
assumed to dispose of specific knowledge in these niches and be especially
successful in innovating specific modules of the overall system (Henderson and
Clark, 1990). However, and central to our reasoning, we argue that due to the spokes’
mentioned resource limitations, the hub does not gain competitive advantages from a
singular relationship with one specific spoke. Instead, we opine that the hub benefits
from the multilateral 1:n-relationship with the network as a whole.
This becomes clear when considering that the main reasons for the emergence of
hub-and-spoke networks may be seen in the fact that competition and demand
heterogeneity have forced large vendors to give up proprietary approaches in order to
gain market share and strive for becoming a de facto standard (Schilling and
Steensma, 2001, Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Put differently, hubs face a system

9
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competition with rival networks that is characterized by network effects (Farrell et
al., 1998, Shapiro and Varian, 1999). Therefore, we argue that hubs prosper in
particular if a great number of spokes participates in their network and offers
complementary functionalities, a fact that is even reinforced since spoke companies
will often not be able to offer solutions for different competing platforms due to
resource limitations.

Network

Hub
1
:
Multilateral

n

Spoke
1
:
Bilateral

Hub
1

Figure 1: Hub-Network Relationship vs. Spoke-Hub Relationship
To sum up, within the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, spoke
companies aim at accessing the hub’s resources, while the hub benefits from the
resources provided by the network as a whole. This distinction in value-generating
relationships is depicted in Figure 1. While hubs gain value from the network and
thus, figuratively, form a multilateral relationship with the network as a whole (left),
spokes enter into bilateral 1:1-relationships with the hub (right). This is summarized
by the following asymmetry.
Asymmetry 1: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, the combination of
complementary resource endowments in a singular hub-spoke relationship only
provides significant value to the spoke. Hubs benefit from complementarities with the
network as a whole.

10
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Investments in Relation-Specific Assets

The concept of complementary resource endowments of partnering firms suggests a
potential value gain through combining resources. However, in order to realize these
benefits, firms have to invest in relation-specific assets (Dyer and Singh, 1998).
Generally, asset specificity has been defined as the “the degree to which an asset can
be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrifice of
productive value” (Williamson, 1990, p. 142). Translated to the case of
interorganizational relationships, asset specificity refers to the degree to which assets
are of low usefulness in other relationships. If hub-and-spoke networks are
understood as a system that collectively produces EAS through inter-firm division of
labor, investing in relation-specific assets can be interpreted as an “optimization of
the components [of the system] working in a particular configuration”, resulting in
combinations that “achieve a functionality unobtainable though combinations of
more independent components” (Schilling, 2000, p. 315f). Stated in other words, the
complementarity of the partners’ resource endowments results in a high degree of
synergistic specificity, i.e., “[t]he degree to which a system achieves greater
functionality by its components being specific to one another” (Schilling, 2000, p.
316).
Regarding the assets that are generally deemed necessary in order to develop and
market software products, the individuals that are involved in the production and
marketing process were found to be of utmost importance, rendering software
production a people business (Boehm, 1987, De Marco and Lister, 1987). More
specifically and in line with the above discussion on resource complementarities, the

11
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knowledge of the involved individuals plays a pivotal role in producing and
marketing software (Robillard, 1999). This is reinforced in the EAS industry, where
knowledge about both software development and business processes is needed. Thus,
in the here analyzed context, relation-specific investments mainly refer to
investments in relation-specific knowledge creation.
Spoke Perspective. We argue that the spokes indeed have to invest heavily in assets
that are specific to the hub in order to participate in the hub’s partner network and
enable the access to complementary resources and capabilities as discussed in the
previous paragraph. First and foremost, spokes have to invest in hub-specific
knowledge accumulation in order to enable the partnership through having their
solutions and resources certified by the hub. In order to get this certification, spokes
have to obtain knowledge about the functioning of the hub’s platform and interfaces
in order to develop solutions that are compatible with all other solutions that build
upon the same platform. Moreover, developers may have to prove their knowledge
about the hub’s technology by attending trainings and passing tests. Once the spokes
have accomplished the certification, continuous investments in hub-specific
technological and market-related knowledge accumulation have to be made in order
to keep up with recent developments in the dynamically changing EAS industry.
Thereby, it is important to consider the difference between information and knowhow (Dyer and Singh, 1998). While information can be codified and stored in data
bases, know-how involves knowledge that is sticky or tacit (Grimaldi and Torrisi,
2001). In order to gain access to external sticky knowledge, spokes may have to put
effort and invest into the creation of absorptive capacity, i.e., “the ability of a firm to

12
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recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to
commercial ends” (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990, p. 128). Moreover, in order to
generate relational rents and not to be imitable by other partnerships, this ability has
to be partner-specific, i.e., in the case of a singular relationship between hub and
spoke, specific to a dyad of organizations (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Partnering with a
hub may provide the spoke with access to certain data bases with information on
technological issues. In order to gain a competitive advantage through leveraging
complementary resource endowments, however, spokes may need to access knowhow within the hub that is not amenable to codification, e.g. because it resides within
the experience and long-time collaboration of certain individuals. Thus, further hubspecific investments into absorptive capacity and knowledge-sharing may be
necessary.
Hub Perspective. While spokes invest in hub-specific knowledge creation and
integration in order to gain relational rents from their partnership with the hub, the
situation turns out to be different on the hub side. As mentioned above, hubs certify
the compatibility and quality of the spokes’ solution before entering a partnership
with a spoke. Thus, hubs as well have to engage in spoke-specific investments to
some extent. However, as the preceding section on resource complementarities
showed, hubs benefit from the network of spokes as a whole and thus, figuratively,
form a relationship with the network (reconsider figure 1). As argued above, due to
the hub’s striving for becoming a de facto standard, this network is especially
valuable for the hub if a great number of spokes participates. Therefore, we argue
that hubs aim at relational extendability, i.e., the “ability to reconfigure existing

13
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competencies for new [interorganizational relationships]” (Bala and Venkatesh,
2007, p. 343). For instance, while spokes strive for getting access to sticky knowhow through developing hub-specific absorptive capacity, we argue that hubs,
instead of engaging in knowledge-sharing routines with particular spokes, may rely
on codifying information regarding technological and market-related issues in order
to efficiently distribute it throughout the network (Grimaldi and Torrisi, 2001).
According to Bala and Venkatesh, relational extendability may result in relational
rents by leading to cost effectiveness, high partner density, partnering flexibility,
partnering agility, greater structural embeddedness, greater control over partners, and
less resource dependency on partners. Thus, in order to generate relational rents from
their multilateral 1:n relationship with the network of spokes, we argue that hubs will
be reluctant to invest heavily in assets that are specific to a singular relationship with
a particular spoke. Instead, hubs may mainly invest in network-specific assets in
order to efficiently leverage the complementarities in their multilateral relationship
with the network as a whole. Summarizing this paragraph on relation-specific asset
investments, we find the following asymmetry:
Asymmetry 2: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, only spokes invest
in relation-specific assets, while the hubs’ investments are mainly network-specific.
Opportunistic Behavior

As outlined above, interorganizational arrangements can be perceived as a trade-off
between the relational rents generated through combining complementary resources
as well as investing in relation-specific assets on the one hand, and the transaction
costs resulting from the threat of opportunistic behavior on the other hand (Dyer,
14
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1997, Williamson, 1981). We argue that in the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS
industry, both hubs and spokes are prone to behave opportunistically to a certain
extent.
Spoke Perspective. Since spokes, as discussed above, invest heavily in their
relationship with a hub, they cannot easily switch to other platform vendors without
loosing the majority of their up-front, hub-specific investments and being forced to
re-invest into the new platform. This lock-in, however, ceteris paribus increases the
hub’s propensity to behave opportunistically, i.e., to exploit the spokes’ lock-in
situation and take advantage of opportunities at the spokes’ expense (Williamson,
1975). Thus, the more spokes invest in assets that are specific to their relationship
with the hub, the more these spokes are at the hub’s mercy not to behave
opportunistically.

Based

on

Lavie’s

(2006)

extension

of

the

RBV

to

interorganizational arrangements, we argue that hub organizations may behave
opportunistically in two important ways. First, hubs may be reluctant to share
resources with a specific spoke and thus decrease the possibilities of value creation.
Second, hubs may behave opportunistically and appropriate what Lavie calls
“outbound spillover rent” (2006), i.e., the hub may capitalize on its dominant
position by absorbing the spokes’ critical knowledge. Both threats of opportunistic
behavior will be analyzed subsequently.
As discussed above, spoke companies benefit from the characteristics of system
competition in hub-and-spoke networks, since this system competition implies the
opportunity to access external resources residing inside the hub organization that the
spokes are highly dependent upon for successfully developing and marketing their

15
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EAS. On the contrary, hubs were found to be mainly dependent on the network as a
whole and not on the resources of a single spoke. The RDT as proposed by (Dyer and
Singh, 1998) deals with such interorganizational dependencies. Central to this theory
is the power distribution between organizational actors that results from
dependencies on external resources that are beyond an organization’s control. Power
is perceived as the counterpart of dependence, since “the power of A over B is equal
to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A” (Emerson, 1962, p. 33). In line
with the above discussion on resource complementarities, we argue that in the huband-spoke networks of the EAS industry, spoke organizations face a situation of
considerable power imbalance.
From a RDT perspective, through participating in the partner network of a hub
organization, spokes attempt to absorb the constraints posed by the limited access to
required external resource. In a situation of power imbalance, however, constraint
absorption is unlikely, since the dominant organization prefers maintaining the status
quo of power distribution since otherwise it would lose “its bargaining power and the
advantageous exchange conditions that accompany it” (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005,
p. 172). Accordingly, we argue that hubs, although fostering a partner network of
spokes, are reluctant to grant unlimited access to complementary resources to
singular spoke organizations. For example, although accessing the hub’s global
marketing channel could be considered highly beneficial for the spokes, the hub is
not expected to grant this access in an unlimited way.
Second, the power imbalance in the hub-spoke relationship together with the high
degree of investments in relation-specific assets performed by the spoke may lead to

16
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knowledge spillovers. The hub may behave opportunistically and capitalize on its
dominant position over the spokes by absorbing the spokes’ critical knowledge that is
unveiled throughout the partnership and apply it to commercial ends itself. For
instance, the hub may appropriate these “outbound spillover rent” (Lavie, 2006) by
imitating a spoke’s functionality after getting access to the spoke’s solutions’ source
code throughout the certification process. The reason for this may be that the hub
changes its product strategy and considers functionalities that were formerly out of
its scope as a part of its core competencies. For a spoke organization, the imitation of
its functionality can be considered a very harmful act of opportunistic behavior, since
it may dramatically jeopardize the spoke’s survival.
Hub Perspective. From the perspective of hub organizations, spokes may follow their
self-interest and, for instance, offer functionalities to their customers that are also
covered by the hub’s solution, thus ending up in a situation of competition, which
may be assumed not to be in the hub’s interest. Moreover, spokes may not comply
with certain interface standards posed by the hub, thus decreasing the overall
compatibility of the systems. However, according to TCE, opportunistic behavior in
interorganizational partnerships is especially likely if the involved actors invest in
partner-specific assets. The more an actor invests in assets that are specific to a
certain partner, the more this actor is locked into the relationship, since ending the
relationship would imply the loss of the partner-specific investment performed ex
ante (Williamson, 1975). As we have shown above, hubs generally avoid investing
heavily in assets that are specific to a single spoke. Therefore, we argue that hubs
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only face minor threats of opportunistic behavior in a singular relationship with a
spoke.
Taken together, we find that due to their dominant position and their reluctance to
invest in spoke-specific assets, hubs only face minor threats of opportunistic
behavior. On the contrary, the spoke organizations have to deal with the hub’s
potential reluctance to share resources. Furthermore, the hub may capitalize on
knowledge spillovers and imitate the spokes’ solutions, posing another class of
opportunistic behavior. To sum up, we find
Asymmetry 3: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, hubs only face
minor threats of opportunistic behavior on the part of the spokes, while the spokes’
business model is threatened by the hubs’ reluctance to share resources and the
potential exploitation of knowledge spillovers.
Governance Mechanisms

Out of the four factors that enable the generation of value through interorganizational
relationships proposed by Dyer and Singh (1998), the application of effective
governance mechanisms plays a special role because its impact on value generation
is twofold. First, from a TCE perspective, effective governance mechanisms may
lower transaction costs and thus directly increase relational rents. Second, effective
governance mechanism may foster the generation of relational rents by increasing the
willingness of partners to engage in value creation initiatives, i.e., to combine
complementary resources and to invest in relation-specific assets and knowledgesharing mechanisms. Generally, two types of governance mechanisms may be
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distinguished. Formal governance mechanisms refer to instruments that are codified
by contracts, technological standards or through other formal devices that enable the
partners to exercise control (like e.g. the discussed certification process). On the
contrary, we understand informal governance mechanisms as implicit coordination
measures that reduce the threat of opportunistic behavior like e.g. mutual adjustment
based on socialization and trust (Adler, 1995, Kraut and Streeter, 1995).
Spoke Perspective. The above discussion on opportunistic behavior showed that the
spokes have to deal with a considerable threat of opportunistic behavior on the part
of the hub organization. This threat of opportunism consists in the hub’s reluctance to
share resources as well as in the threat of knowledge spillover. Dyer (1997) suggests
that in the face of relation-specific investments, informal governance mechanism are
better suited for impeding opportunistic behavior of a partner than formal governance
mechanisms. In a similar way, considering the power imbalance between hub and
spoke, Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) propose that dependent organizations engage in
unilateral measures to deal with the limited access to resources resulting from power
imbalance. The dependent organization is assumed to apply tactics to “restructure
dependencies by aiming directly at the constraining party in the relationship”
(Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005, p. 167). For instance, dependent actors may attempt to
stabilize “the flow of valued resources by socializing members of the constraining
organization or through the exchange of other valuable goods, such as status,
friendship, or information” (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005, p. 168). Following this
point of view, we argue that while hubs behave opportunistically on a strategic and
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organizational level, the governance mechanisms that act as a remedy against the
threat of this opportunistic behavior can mainly be found on an individual level.
For instance, we have shown that, despite the spokes’ investments in hub-specific
absorptive capacity, hubs may be unwilling to grant unlimited access to their
commercial, technological, and social capital. Thus, in order to actually exploit the
access to external resources, spokes may rely on informal governance mechanisms.
This assertion is substantiated by the findings of Yli-Renko et al. (2001), who argue
that external knowledge acquisition from key customers that is found to increase firm
success is positively influenced by social interaction, the quality of the relationship,
and the network ties provided by this customers. We argue that Yli-Renko et al.’s
results may be transferred to hub-spoke relationships in the EAS industry, holding
that through informal governance mechanisms like social interaction, spokes may
exploit the access to complementary resources residing within the hub organization
in spite of the hub’s discussed unwillingness to share resources with a specific spoke.
Furthermore, informal relationships with decision makers within the hub
organization that are based on trust may prevent the hub from exploiting the spoke’s
know-how that is unveiled through the partnership and thus avoid an imitation of the
spoke’s business model, even though it might be strategically appropriate from the
hub organization’s point of view.
However, strategic re-orientation and pressure from a greater number of customers to
offer a certain functionality (turning the market for this functionality from a niche
into a large segment) may imply the necessity for the responsible individuals within
the hub organization to eventually imitate the spoke’s solutions in spite of the
20
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spoke’s informal relationships with hub staff. In such a situation, informal
governance mechanisms may encourage the hub to share knowledge with a specific
spoke that is valuable for its long-term success. For instance, hub personnel may
“warn” the spoke in advance and thereby provide the spoke with more time to bring
in its capability to innovate and to come up with new solutions and functionalities.
Moreover, hub staff may actively provide the spoke with hints which market
segments are promising and will not be addressed by the hub in the future (Uzzi,
1997, p. 45). Thus, informal governance mechanisms can be seen as a possibility for
spokes both to actually exploit the gained access to external resources and to ensure
future success.
Hub Perspective. In contrast to the relational governance mechanisms aimed at by
the spokes, hubs may more strongly rely on formal governance mechanisms. The
discussion on opportunistic behavior in the previous section showed that hubs only
face minor threats of opportunism due to the low amount of spoke-specific
investments and the spokes’ dependence on the external resources owned by the hub.
Furthermore, as the discussion on relation-specific asset investments pointed out,
hubs aim at efficiently coordinating the potentially great number of spoke
organization. Therefore, we expect hubs to mostly rely on formal governance
through contracts, technological standards, and the mentioned certification process in
order to efficiently prevent the potentially great number of spokes from behaving
opportunistically.
Taken together, this discussion suggests that the formal governance mechanisms
applied by the hub in order to efficiently coordinate the network of spokes may not
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be sufficient for spokes in order to create relational rents and to access sticky
knowledge that resides inside the hub organization. Instead, informal governance
mechanisms like social interaction and trust may be necessary to gain competitive
advantages through the interorganizational relationship with the hub and to develop
hub-specific absorptive capacity. Summarizing the discussion on appropriate
governance mechanisms, we find the following proposition.
Proposition: In the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, hubs rely on formal
governance mechanism and standards to coordinate the network and to gain
relational rents from the hub-network relationship. In contrast, in order to ensure
long-term relational rents, spokes rely on informal governance mechanisms and the
development of hub-specific absorptive capacity.
Summary

We argue that within the hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry, hubs and
spokes pursue substantially different agendas. More specifically, we find three interrelated types of asymmetries that together explain the differential governance
mechanisms applied by hubs and spokes. First, hubs benefit from complementarities
with the network of spokes, whereas spokes create value through accessing external
resources that reside within the hub organization. Second, in order to benefit from
their respective value-generating relationship (bilateral vs. multilateral), spokes
invest in hub-specific assets, whereas the hubs’ investments are mainly networkspecific. Third, this has significant consequences for the threat of opportunistic
behavior hub and spoke are exposed to respectively. While hubs face only minor
threats of opportunistic behavior, the spokes’ business model may be jeopardized if
22
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the hub is reluctant to share resources or capitalizes on knowledge spillovers. This, in
turn, has consequences for the governance mechanisms hub and spoke apply. While
hubs mainly rely on formal governance mechanisms, spokes seek to apply informal
governance mechanisms to prevent the hub from behaving opportunistically and to
gain access to sticky knowledge within the hub organization, thus exploiting the
access to external, complementary resources and ensuring future success. Taken
together, we argue that while hubs strive for a standardization of the partnerships
with small software companies, spokes aim at relational governance and an increased
uniqueness of their relationship with the hub. Figure 2 summarizes our framework.

Type of Relational
Complementarity
Multilateral
(Network)

Bilateral
(Hub-Spoke)
Type of Relational
Investment

Network-specific

LOW

Formal

Hub-specific
Relative Threat of
Opportunistic
Behavior by Partner
Type
Governance
Mechanism

HIGH

of
Informal

Overall Relational
Objective
Standardization

Uniqueness

Figure 2: Theoretical Framework
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Discussion
Our preceding analysis has shown that the notion of complementarity and its wider
implications on partnership governance need to be re-evaluated in a new light when
partnerships in hub-and-spoke networks of the EAS industry are examined. The
differential roles that hub and spoke organizations play in such a network as well as
the power imbalance that exists between the partners result in a chain of
asymmetries. This chain of asymmetries in turn results in different types of
governance mechanisms that are preferred by both parties, yet need to be aligned in
order to achieve mutual benefits from the partnership.
Our theoretical analysis shows that spokes strive for 1:1-complementarity with the
hub, while the hub strives for 1:n-complementary with all of its spokes. Therefore, in
line with the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998), the spokes seek to tighten their
relationship with the hub through relation-specific investments. These investments
are the basis for achieving a comparative advantage over their competitors. By
contrast, the hub seeks to invest into network resources that enable economies of
scale and scope in network management, i.e., hubs strive for relational extendabilty.
Accordingly, the consequences of opportunistic behavior are more severe for spokes
than for the hubs. Paradoxically, the only way for the spokes to avoid opportunistic
behavior of the hub is to invest even more in relation-specific assets, e.g. through
building up social relationships and mutual trust with hub personnel. Thus, the spoke
would favor informal governance. By contrast, the hub would seek to increase its
network investments and thus foster formal governance, e.g. through establishing
formal procedures on how the spokes’ solutions can be certified. Hence, contrary to
24
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the findings of Bala and Venkatesh (1998) who argue that an increased relational
extendability generally results in relational rents for the partnering organizations, we
showed that in the context of this study, relational extendability creates relational
rents only for the hub organization in its relationship with the network as a whole.
Spokes, in contrast, aim at increasing the uniqueness of their relationship with the
hub, i.e. the relational specificity (Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). Thereby, spokes may
thwart the hub’s plan to create value from their multilateral relationship with the
network of spokes through efficiently coordinating the dyadic relationships.
Managerial Implications. By incorporating this tension into our research model, our
study has several important managerial implications for organizations in the EAS
industry. Hub organizations may learn from our findings and dispense with a mainly
efficiency-driven view. In order to be successful in the system competition with other
networks in the long run, hubs have to find a reasonable balance between efficiently
coordinating the network and satisfying the singular spokes. As we have shown, the
spokes strive for relational specificity on an individual level, engaging in personal
ties with hub staff. This implies that for the hub organization, it may be more
reasonable to systematically install a certain degree of relational governance that
complements the formal governance through standards and certification (Poppo and
Zenger, 2002), instead of letting the coordination through personal ties blossom in an
uncontrollable way. As a lesson learned from our study, the ideal goal of hub
organizations should be to enable a “mass customization” of the governance in their
partner networks, i.e., to efficiently satisfy the spokes’ desire for relational
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governance. Improved technological solutions for collaboration like, e.g., web 2.0
technologies, may be a possible way towards such a “mass customization”.
Spokes, on the other hand, were found to aim at informally governing their
relationship with the hub. We argue that informal ties on a personal level may indeed
be beneficial for spokes to get access to external technological, commercial, and
social capital. However, spokes may face the problem that sociologists refer to as
overembeddedness (Uzzi, 1997), i.e., by, at least in the short run, successfully relying
on strong personal ties, spokes may miss to develop their own technological,
commercial, and social capital. If the personal network ceases to exist, e.g. due to job
fluctuation, spokes may eventually be penalized. Generally, the scenario that the
spokes face resembles a classical prisoners’ dilemma. If one spoke leverages
personal ties and thereby undercuts the standard coordination mechanisms, it may be
beneficial for this spoke. If all spokes do so, however, the whole network and thus its
participators may eventually lose ground in the system competition with other
networks that coordinate the relationships more efficiently.
Theoretical Implications. Apart from these practical implications, our study makes
important theoretical contributions. First, we complement existing work on the link
between

complementarities

interorganizational

in

arrangements.

the

software

Instead

of

stack

and

analyzing

the
the

success

of

influence

of

complementarity on success on a high level, we focused on the alignment of the
governance mechanisms with the type of complementarity. Regarding the differential
types of complementarity, we added to previous studies by considering not only
technological resources, but also the partners’ endowments with commercial and
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social capital. Moreover, we differentiate the complementarities of the hub with the
network as a whole as well as with a specific spoke. As such, we find that the type of
complementarity – bilateral (1:1) versus multilateral (1:n) – heavily influences the
applied governance mechanisms. Second, we apply the relational view as proposed
by Dyer and Singh (1998) to the scenario of firm imbalance in hub-and-spoke
networks of the EAS industry. The relational view holds that both partners to an
exchange have to invest in relation-specific assets in order to leverage
complementary resource-endowments. On the contrary, the emergence of partner
networks in the EAS industry where only spokes invest in assets that are specific to
the relationship with the hub shows that this does not necessarily have to be the case.
As a direct consequence of the differences between hub and spoke regarding relationspecific asset investments, spokes apply informal governance mechanisms with the
goal of value creation in their relationship with the hub, while the hub strives for
generating value through the network as a whole. Due to these differing value
propositions in hub-and-spoke networks, the role of value appropriation, as
highlighted by Lavie (2007), is of less importance. Other than in more closely tight
strategic alliances, where partners work together to achieve a common outcome, the
value of hub and spoke results from leveraging resources and products of each other.
Limitations and Future Research. One of the main limitations of our theoretical
framework is its static nature, which takes power imbalance between dominant hubs
and small spokes as a matter of fact. This view neglects that the power distribution
between hub and spoke may change over time and eventually turn into a situation of
mutual dependence (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). Ahuja (2000) mentions radical
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innovations that mark discontinuities in the technical progress as an opportunity for
new entrants to develop significant resources. In a similar way, the spoke may
achieve a situation of mutual dependence through developing special commercial or
social capital, e.g., if a former unimportant customer base turns into a key segment.
Such an increase in technological, commercial, or social capital that is
complementary to the hub’s resources may turn the bilateral partnership between a
hub and a spoke into a source of value for the hub. If the synergistic specificity of
hub’s and spoke’s resources is high, the hub may decide to merge with or acquire the
spoke organization in order to internalize the benefits that result from this synergistic
specificity and absorb the constraints posed by the emerging power of the spoke4.
Although the small size of spoke organizations and their oftentimes relatively short
period of existence may render it difficult for the majority of spokes to develop
resources the hub organization is indeed dependent upon (Wernerfelt, 1984),
considering the possibility that spokes may become more powerful over time could
be a promising theme for future research. Specifically, future research could take a
dynamic process view and analyze the lifecycle of partnerships between hubs and
spokes (Smith Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).
As discussed above, the asymmetry in relationship specific investments between hub
and spoke translates into opposing governance mechanisms which may threaten the
stability of the partnership in the long run. This discrepancy calls for future research

4

Such a situation of merging with or being acquired by the hub may actually be in the interest of
many spokes.
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on mediating governance modes that help balancing out the preferences for informal
(spoke) versus formal (hub) governance. To this end, it may be interesting to
examine the role of ICT tools for collaboration as a mediating mechanism. Such a
collaboration platform would allow the hub to address the needs of multiple spokes
simultaneously, while still accounting for the requirements of particular spokes
through 1:1 collaboration. The concept of communities of practice (CoP) may be
transferred to this scenario, where multiple CoPs would possibly coexist in the huband-spoke network (Gongla and Rizzuto, 2001).
Furthermore, future research may draw on our theoretical insights in further
analyzing and empirically validating both the existence of the proposed asymmetries
between hubs and spokes as well as the causal relationship between resource
complementarities, relation-specific asset investments, the threat of opportunistic
behavior, and appropriate governance mechanisms. In order to obtain a more
powerful explanatory model, the causal links suggested in figure 1 may be enriched
by considering the consequences and interrelations of the complementarity of the
technological, commercial, and social capital on governance mechanisms in more
detail. As another promising theme for future work, we call for an in-depth analysis
of the informal governance mechanisms applied by the spokes. While our study
addressed informal governance mechanisms in a general way and mentioned e.g.
socialization and trust, future research may examine in more detail which, when, and
how informal governance mechanisms are actually applied. Moreover, it may be
fruitful to include the success of the dyadic partnerships between hubs and spokes
from the hubs’, the spokes’, the dyadic, and the network perspective into a
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comprehensive research model. Such an enhanced research model would explain the
impact of complementarities on partnership success. However, we argue that the
incorporation of governance mechanisms as a mediator of this link may result in a
research model with increased explanatory power.
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